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Implications and Consequences of Post-Modern Philosophy 
for Contemporary Transpersonal Studies 
III. Deleuze and Some Related 
Phenomenologies of Felt Meaning:
Psychosis and Mysticism as Inherent “Structures of Thought”
Harry Hunt
Brock University
Ontario, Canada
There is a surprising confluence in the philosopher Deleuze, the psychoanalyst Bion, and 
phenomenological psychologist Gendlin on what Deleuze terms the immediate “sense” of 
understanding and Gendlin calls “felt meaning.”  Beneath its more differentiated propositional 
articulations, all three understand this phenomenon as a felt sense of constantly shifting 
coherence and incoherence, and based in often tacit metaphoric, figural, and/or synesthetic 
processes. For Deleuze and Bion, in particular, psychotic thought disorder is understood 
as the exaggeration of this incoherence potential within all felt meaning. Correspondingly, 
the expansion or enhancement of the felt coherence aspect of ordinary thought becomes the 
basis for the mystical states of consciousness that become a major concern of the later Bion 
and Deleuze. The Indian spiritual teacher Krishnamurti, known for his use of an ordinary 
language of deceptive simplicity to describe spiritual enlightenment, offers a striking 
confirmation of Deleuze and Bion on numinous states as latent within all felt meaning.
, 33(2), 2014, pp. 16-32
Perhaps not coincidentally, the 1960s saw three complementary and independent attempts, by the post-modern French philosopher Gilles Deleuze 
(1925-1995), the psychoanalyst W. R. Bion (1897-1979), 
and the phenomenological psychologist Eugene Gendlin, 
to explicate a felt, experiential, or vivial core within all 
thinking. Deleuze (1968/1994; 1969/1990) termed this 
“sense,” Gendlin (1962) “felt meaning,” and Bion (1962, 
1965), more opaquely as “alpha function” (in order to 
avoid what he feared as misleading associations).  For all 
three the felt aspect of thought centered on an immediate 
sense of coherence or incoherence, separate from any 
subsequent or prior verbal or conceptual articulation. 
Initially Deleuze and Bion would focus on psychosis and 
psychotic thought disorder as the exaggeration of the 
incoherence or contractive side as an inherent potential 
in all thought. Later, Deleuze, Bion, and by implication 
Gendlin would see mysticism and transpersonal states as 
the maximum expansion of its integrative or coherence 
aspect—also as a latent potential within ordinary felt 
meaning.  
Phenomenologies of Felt Meaning 
in Deleuze, Gendlin, and Bion
Deleuze , Gendlin, and Bion were all after a “what it is like” of thought, perhaps also entailing their 
shared density and circularity of descriptive prose, to be 
more linearly unpacked in what follows.
Deleuze
 In his The Logic of Sense (1969/1990) Deleuze 
suggests that beneath the more traditional “images of 
thought,” based on classification and logic (Aristotle) or 
resolution of paradox (Plato), there is a deeper, directly 
sensed coherence/incoherence, as the immediately felt 
singularity or “thisness” of the unfolding event.  Before we 
can decide a more standard propositional truth or falsity, 
there is the question of whether our felt understanding 
Keywords: sense, felt meaning, alpha function, image schemas, cross modality, 
synesthesia, physiognomy, Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position, mirroring, 
Eckhart’s Godhead, immediate perception, mind of innocence
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“makes sense,” or slides toward an equally inherent sense 
of nonsense, confusion, stupidity, and pointlessness—
which exaggerated becomes psychotic thought disorder. 
For Deleuze these inversions of sense are part of the inner 
“structures of thought as such” (1968/1994, p. 151).
There is an acephalism of thought just as there is 
an amnesia in memory. ... [In psychosis] thought 
is forced to think its central collapse, its fracture, 
... [its inability] to manage to think something. ... 
Schizophrenia is not only a human fact but also a 
possibility for thought. (Deleuze, 1968/1994, pp. 
147, 148)
 In terms of the larger history of philosophy, 
Deleuze (1969/1990) sees the first version of his “sense” 
in the Stoic distinction between the “corporeals” of 
physical cause and effect (as in atomistic reductionism) 
and the “incorporeals” of humanly experienced events, 
with their own reality or “extra being” that Deleuze will 
also term “phantasm.” In this regard Deleuze might be 
taken as offering, through the Stoics, his own version of 
Wilhelm Dilthey’s later distinction between the cognitive 
domains of causal explanation in the physical sciences 
and the felt understandings of empathized hermeneutic 
events (Dilthey, 1976; Hunt, 2005a).  Deleuze also 
locates the singularities of sense in the haecity or unique 
“thisness” of an incarnated personhood in the medieval 
nominalism of Duns Scotus, which, like Heidegger 
(1919/2004), he traces forward into the felt “expression” of 
meaning in Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness. 
All this is contained within Deleuze’s (1968/1994) larger 
concern with a post-Nietzschean yea-saying metaphysics 
of becoming, as the perpetual repetition of difference 
and multiplicity, and a naturalistic spiritual immanence 
he shared with Bataille (see Hunt, 2013).
 Sense is the “surface” or “membrane” of specific 
semantic meanings that for Deleuze (1969/1990) both 
joins and separates the “depths” of biological “states of 
affairs” and the “heights” of conceptual proposition. It 
is the expressive “inside” of propositional thought, both 
“encasing” and “carrying” it forward as the semantic 
“beingness” of the situation.  Part of its very tenuousness 
and vulnerability, and conjoined potential for expansion 
in spiritual states, is that it is entirely spontaneous. It 
is never “constructed” or intended in the manner of a 
sentence. Deleuze compares it to the Zen of archery, 
where the bow fires itself. It is this immediate temporal 
unfoldment of sense that William James (1890) captured 
when he observed that phenomenologically it would be 
more accurate to say “it thinks” or “thoughts now” in 
the same manner as “it rains”—a view also shared by 
Nietzsche (1886/1954) and Heidegger, with the latter 
stating “we never come to thoughts, they come to us” 
(1971, p. 6). Clearly then Deleuze is reflecting the 
aspect of thought most associated with the spontaneous 
imaginative absorption also highlighted in creativity 
research (Michalica & Hunt, 2013).
 It will be significant for what follows that 
the sensed coherence/incoherence of meaning has an 
intrinsic metaphoric component, animating it from 
within at key “turning points” and “inflections.”  For 
Deleuze these are the:
Bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers. ... critical 
points just as temperature has critical points—
points of fusion, congelation, boiling, condensation, 
coagulation, and crystallization. (Deleuze, 1969/1990, 
pp. 52, 53).
Not only is this reminiscent of Jung on the language of 
alchemy as metaphoric of spiritual development, but it 
anticipates Lakoff and Johnson (1999) on an underlying 
metaphoricity in all thought resting on cross modal 
“image schemas” such as container/contained, center/
periphery, balance/imbalance, and multiple varieties of 
links and forces. It is also similar to the phenomenon of 
vocal sound physiognomies that Deleuze (1969/1990) will 
make use of in his analysis of the nonsense symbolisms 
of Lewis Carroll, and which had already been developed 
by the cognitive psychologists Osgood (1960) and Werner 
and Kaplan (1963). Their work helped to establish a cross-
cultural commonality of synesthetic meanings in vocal 
sounds—so that a nonsense word such as “zeca” will 
statistically tend to be rated as small, angular, moving, and 
happy, while “voag” is felt to be large, round, static, and 
sad.  These intonational effects are fundamental to poetry 
and vocal music (Edelson, 1975), and will be central 
to Deleuze on the malevolent meanings of language in 
schizophrenia. (Their more positive manifestation is of 
course central to the vocal mantras of meditative practice.) 
Later Deleuze and his psychoanalyst collaborator Guattari 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1972/2009; 1991/1994) will term 
this the “figural” aspect of felt meaning and see its more 
integrative expansion in mystical experience.1
Gendlin
 Eugene Gendlin in his Experiencing and the 
Creation of Meaning (1962) uses the term “felt meaning” 
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in ways strikingly similar to Deleuze on sense. He calls 
attention to both its indefiniteness and impossibility 
of direct description, which Deleuze will refer to as 
its “impassibility.” At the same time felt meaning is 
so specific and singular that we  sense immediately 
when our propositional articulation either does not do 
justice to what we so definitely sense we are “trying to 
say,” or else starts to depart from it into a differing or 
entirely new felt sense. It is both impalpable and the very 
opposite of anything vague or indefinite. Felt meanings 
are both preliminary enough to permit multiple lines 
of propositional articulation and complete enough to 
sustain our participation, confident or not, in many 
ongoing situations without any articulation at all.  Both 
Gendlin and Deleuze were independently struck by the 
way felt meanings can not be fully said as such, while 
admitting of seemingly infinite propositions “about” 
them—with each such statement preserving its felt 
difference from the felt meaning it addresses.
 Gendlin stresses the personal and social 
significance of our felt meanings of coherence and 
incoherence.  It will feel crucial, and this independent 
of our later realizations of its logical or factual truth, 
whether we have this inner sense of felt understanding 
and coherence—“getting what is going on”—or whether 
we must suffer the inner loneliness and self doubt 
of being “at sea”—say in a high school mathematics 
class where others around us seem, whether they 
really do or not, to “get it.”  Although Gendlin is not 
explicitly concerned with psychosis, one can see how 
the chronic exaggeration of this “not understanding” 
where others do would move towards the confusional 
states of thought disorder. Gendlin does link the 
impalpability of felt meaning to James’ (1890) concept 
of the “fringe” of consciousness, while for James it was 
expansions and contractions in that background of all 
awareness that could describe mystical states and their 
negative inversions in psychosis. For James, in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), mystical states 
are understood as a “deepened sense of significance” (p. 
344) and all-embracing oneness—what in Gendlin’s 
terms would be a felt meaning of everything. Deleuze 
(1968/1994) similarly speaks of “an unconscious of pure 
thought which constitutes the sphere of sense ... [with 
its] infinite regress” (p. 155).
  Like Deleuze, Gendlin’s felt meaning has an 
imagistic or figural core. In his later writings Gendlin 
(1978) would develop a method called “focusing” in 
which more inchoate felt meanings could be made 
more vividly and explicitly conscious by going back and 
forth between kinesthetically expressive bodily states, 
congruent visual imagery, and emergent key words and 
phrases.  Later followers of Gendlin (Petitmengin, 2007) 
have developed a more explicitly synesthetic foundation 
for his concept of felt meaning, closely related to similar 
attempts to establish synesthetic states of cross modal 
sensory translation as the root of all metaphor (Hunt, 
1985, 2005b; Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001), and 
open to their own separate transpersonal development 
(Hunt, 1995, 2001; Bresnick & Levin, 2006).
Bion
 In his Learning from Experience (1962) the 
British psychoanalyst W. R. Bion (see also 1965, 
1967, 1971, 1977) understood his “alpha function” in 
essentially the same way as Deleuze on sense and Gendlin 
on felt meaning, as the immediate sense of coherence/
incoherence in semantic understanding. On that 
depends any more specific differentiation of cognitive 
proposition and specific emotional articulation. The 
experiential core of coherence rests on a felt sense of 
beingness in the ongoing situation—its “saturation” [or 
not] as a “felt reality.”  It is here that Bion will locate 
an inherent capacity for spiritual realization, as the 
reciprocal enhancement of felt reality that contrasts with 
the contraction and loss of inner presence in psychosis:2
The belief that reality could be known is mistaken 
because reality is not something which lends itself 
to being known. It is impossible to know reality for 
the same reason that makes it impossible to sing 
potatoes; they may be grown, or pulled, or eaten, 
but not sung.  Reality has to be “been”; there should 
be a transitive verb “to be” expressly for use with the 
term “reality.” (Bion, 1965, p. 148)
 As with Deleuze and Gendlin, alpha function 
has an immediate imagistic basis—consistent with the 
cross modal synthesis that the neurologist Geschwind 
(1965) made basic to the human symbolic capacity.  For 
Bion alpha function is a direct manifestation of Aristotle’s 
“sensus communis” or “common sense,” in which the 
capacity for cross modal translation across gesture, visual 
imagery, and vocal expression underpins both human 
self awareness or “mirroring” and the multiple domains 
of symbolization (see Hunt, 1995).
 At the same time, with Deleuze, alpha function 
is curiously tenuous and vulnerable, constantly on the 
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verge of an unravelling of understanding that becomes 
chronically exaggerated in psychotic thought disorder. 
Bion is struck by the tenuousness of thought in everyone, 
and our capacity to sense that, and often to sense the 
demands of thinking as an unwelcome burden. He 
describes:
the inability of even the most advanced human 
beings to make use of their thoughts because the 
capacity to think is rudimentary in all of us. (Bion, 
1962, p. 14).
This is a striking statement.  One would not say similarly 
that “the capacity to fly is rudimentary in all eagles,” but 
rather that this species defining characteristic is perfectly 
adapted to their ecological niche. Yet as human beings 
we often sense a constant struggle with the symbolic 
capacity that defines us.
 With Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2009), this 
tenuousness of thought can have a significant collective 
aspect for Bion. Indeed, the writings of all three thinkers 
appeared in an era that combined a radical spirit of 
experiential exploration and confrontation with the 
beginnings of an accelerating awareness of now global 
problems of humanity in governance, population, 
ecology, and economic disparity that seem to be beyond 
the cognitive capacity for solution by the very minds 
that created them.  A widespread feeling that these issues 
somehow do not “make sense,” and of contemporary life 
as failing to “cohere” or “hold together,” is strikingly 
anticipated by Bion as a collective version of thought 
disorder:
The problems which reality poses can turn out to be 
beyond the capacity of the human mind. ... where we 
are sufficiently ... advanced to grasp the magnitude 
of our problems, but are not sufficiently advanced 
to know what to do about them. ... This, I think, is 
the situation in which the autistic child finds itself. 
... so highly intelligent that it is capable of seeing the 
vastness of its problems, but without any equipment 
with which to deal with it. The human race may be 
reaching a similar point ... at which the most gifted, 
most capable of our thinkers may be ... inadequately 
equipped for the realities of the situation in which 
we find ourselves. (Bion, 1974, pp. 134-5)
We then respond collectively with some mixture of 
delusive over-certainty, confusion, and stuporous 
avoidance.
Deleuze and Bion on Psychosis 
as “Structure of Thought”
 It is important for what follows to stress that 
Deleuze and Bion, in placing psychosis, and later 
mysticism, on a continuum with ordinary felt meaning 
and as a latency that is part of its very phenomenology, 
are representative of an approach to psychiatry based 
on qualitative description and empathic understanding. 
It is part of a tradition of European existential-
phenomenological analysis (Binswanger, 1963; 
Minkowski, 1933/1970), more recently renewed and 
extended by Sass (1992, 2000), and entirely consistent 
with Harry Stack Sullivan’s well known statement about 
schizophrenia, that “we are all more simply human than 
otherwise” (1953, p. 32).  As a method of understanding, 
related to Deleuze’s “incorporeals” of sense, it is 
potentially consistent with any contemporary causal, 
“corporeal” explanations of these chronic distortions of 
felt meaning in terms of genetics and/or neurochemistry. 
It is also relevant that while the approach of Deleuze 
and Bion to psychosis as the exaggeration of an 
incoherence within all thought is purely qualitative, 
it is fully consistent with current quantitative research 
on high creativity as associated with medium to higher 
levels of schizotypal and bipolar personality, while the 
very highest levels tend instead to shut down these same 
processes of creative application (Michalica & Hunt, 
2013).
Deleuze
 In approaching schizophrenia as an intrinsic 
“possibility of thought,” a vulnerability first appearing at 
the “surface” of sense, Deleuze (1969/1990) begins with 
several autobiographical essays by F. Scott Fitzgerald 
(1936/1993). Fitzgerald, in contrast to his wife Zelda 
who advanced into clinical schizophrenia, described his 
own painful period of loss of a sensed self-being, inner 
presence, and felt reality, bearing a striking similarity to 
Sass (2000) on the preclinical or prodromal signs of loss 
of felt meaning that can precede psychotic diagnosis. 
For Deleuze this is a diminution of the “compossibility” 
of sense—the degree to which its multiple organizing 
points of “inflection” are felt as belonging together in a 
vital unfolding whole. Fitzgerald likened himself during 
this period to a “cracked plate,” still of limited household 
use but not unless it is kept away from the stresses of 
any overheating. In this context, Deleuze describes the 
initial dilemma of both the alcoholic and schizophrenic 
as not having:
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tried anything special beyond their power, and yet 
they wake up as if from a battle that has been too 
much for them ... aware of a silent crack in themselves. 
(Deleuze, 1969/1990, p. 154, 155)
He quotes from Fitzgerald, describing himself in the mid 
1930s as suffering:
a sort of blow that comes from within—that you 
don’t feel until it’s too late to do anything about it. ... 
Holding myself very carefully like cracked crockery 
... it occurred to me ... that of all natural forces, 
vitality is the incommunicable one ... you have it or 
you haven’t. ... This [vacuous quiet] was something 
I could neither accept nor struggle against. ... It was 
strange to have no self—to be like a little boy left 
alone in a big house, who knew that now he could 
do anything he wanted ... but found that there was 
nothing he wanted to do. (Fitzgerald, 1936/1993, 
pp. 69, 74, 76, 78, 79)
 Deleuze likens the maximum incompossibility or 
fragmentation of meaning in full schizophrenic thought 
disorder to an involuntary infliction of the nonsense 
words and phrases dramatized in the Alice books of Lewis 
Carroll. With words like “slithy,” “snark,” and “uffish,” 
incompossibility has contracted to the point where the 
sound of the word “says its own sense.  It denotes what 
it expresses and expresses what it denotes” (Deleuze, 
1969/1990, p. 67).  There can be no true or false here but 
only a sort of narrowed “sense in excess” (p. 78). As his 
major example of this fragmentation of ordinary words 
into the malevolent intrusive meanings of psychosis, 
Deleuze cites the surrealist actor and playwright Antonin 
Artaud and his accounts of his own schizophrenic 
episodes, also used by Sass (1992) to illustrate the 
hyper-reflexive, involuntary introspective sensitization 
that characterizes schizophrenia. Artaud’s accounts 
(as cited by Deleuze, 1969/1990) show an involuntary 
disinhibition of Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) vocal sound 
physiognomies, normally subordinated within the 
larger context of sentences. Deleuze mentions Artaud’s 
specific dislike of the nonsense humour of Lewis Caroll, 
since the latter seemed to be mocking the malevolent 
physiognomies that Artaud had to suffer, where the 
sounds of words intruded like “physical wounds”—
“wounding unbearable sonorous qualities [that] invade 
the body” (Deleuze, 1969/1990, p. 88).  This experience 
of fragmented meanings as bizarre physical sensations 
felt within the body will become central to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1972/2009) later use of psychosis to explicate 
the inner structure of all thought.
Bion
 Bion (1962, 1965, 1967) similarly locates 
schizophrenic thought disorder as the exaggeration of the 
ordinary incoherence and fragility of all felt meaning. 
In the confusional states of psychosis this fragmentation 
takes the form of separate “beta elements” or “bizarre 
objects” in which word-sensations become intrusive 
physical “things” and outward objects become animated 
by thought-like physiognomies—an ordinary door-knob 
suddenly fascinating with an uncanny malevolence. 
Very much in the spirit of Bion on the more ordinary 
roots of such incoherence, the psychoanalyst Harold 
F. Searles (1979) has described the common phases 
experienced in writing an academic paper as milder 
forms of clinical thought-disorder: 1) Initially there 
can be that burst of intuitive insight whose enthusiasm 
soon proves premature and unworkable—a mentality 
that chronically exaggerated would approximate the 
“megalomania” and “over-inclusiveness” of delusion. 
2) This premature sense of all-embracing intuitive 
truth can be followed by a phase of panic at the sheer 
diversity of all the “facts” that should be included, 
now appearing as the “meaningless” fragments of one’s 
previous insight—and which exaggerated in confusional 
states becomes Bion’s over-concretized beta elements.  3) 
This confusional overwhelm can then alternate with a 
period of stasis, a reactive mental blankness, shutdown, 
and apathy—an empty painful waiting for something 
to happen. Exaggerated in psychosis this becomes 
catatonic stupor and trance-like “blocking” of thought. 
Just as milder versions of these states can alternate back 
and forth in intellectual work, Chapman (1967) found a 
similar rapid shifting in the self-reports of schizophrenic 
patients between over-inclusive delusions, confusional 
disorganization, and stuporous blocking.
 For Bion, in both intellectual work and psychotic 
thought disorder, there is the dilemma of how to wait 
within the gap of unfilled time-ahead with sufficient 
patience and faith to allow an integrative coming 
together, or “saturation,” of orienting pre-conception 
and “selected fact” into a coherent and sustainable sense 
of felt meaning.  The patient, rendered hyper-sensitive to 
this sheer openness of time-ahead, responds to it with a 
“nameless dread” and defends against that with delusion, 
confusional fragmentation, and stupor. Both in these 
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extremes of “attacks on linking,” and in the ordinary 
sense of thought as burden and incipient incoherence, 
Bion finds a “hatred of thought” in which the mind turns 
against itself and its capacity for cognitive and emotional 
transformation. Bion finds this rejection amplified in 
myths of the tree of knowledge in Eden, the tower of 
Babel, and the threat and riddle of the Sphinx in Oedipus. 
Where the mystic comes to directly experience this time-
ahead as a “formless infinite” and “being” that answers 
and completes that openness, the patient, while sensitive 
on a similar level to this inner form of thought itself, 
experiences it as a terrifying emptiness and deadness, in 
which space seems strangely frozen and static and time 
stopped. This sense of inner stoppage, as the opposite of 
the dynamic open spaciousness of mystical states (Tulku, 
1977), is conveyed in multiple autobiographic accounts of 
schizophrenia (Sechehaye, 1951; Minkowski, 1933/1970; 
Eigen, 1996). In this regard psychosis (and mysticism) 
appear as a sort of “involuntary introspection” (Hunt, 
1984, 1995, 2007; Sass, 1992, 2000, 2014) amplifying 
the inner dynamics of coherence/incoherence within 
the felt meaning described more or less in common by 
Deleuze, Gendlin, and Bion.
Mysticism and Psychosis 
as Reciprocal Amplifications 
of the Inner Form of Thought
For both Deleuze and Bion, psychosis and mystical states reflect, in Deleuze’s terms, the maximum 
“incompossibility” and maximum “compossibility” 
respectively, of the felt sense of semantic meaning. It 
seems striking that both Deleuze and Bion independently 
use, as their understanding of the normally embedded 
inner structure of thought, the British psychoanalyst 
Melanie Klein’s (1963) model of a “paranoid-schizoid 
position” of early infancy. This was her controversial 
view of an initial “oral” organization of “part object” 
fragments of not yet integrated whole “imagos” of 
the primal parents, supposedly felt by the infant as 
physically inside its body in much the way described as 
the intrusive internal energies of the body hallucinations 
suffered by adult schizophrenics. Although Deleuze and 
Bion will develop Klein’s model to somewhat different 
effect, both, Bion most explicitly, will move past the fixed 
implication in classical psychoanalytic thinking of both 
states as “regressions” to infancy, toward a more formal 
understanding. This brings both better in line with more 
recent cognitive understandings of both schizophrenia 
(Sass, 1992, 2000) and mystical experience (Hunt, 1984, 
1995) as developmentally complex transformations of a 
more abstract self awareness.
Deleuze and Guattari
 In Anti-Oedipus (1972/2009), as part of 
the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s also 
associated with R. D. Laing (1967), Deleuze and his 
psychoanalyst collaborator Felix Guattari described 
a single “schizophrenic process” as the radical “un-
coding,” “de-habituation,” or “de-territorialization” of 
mind that releases an “unchanneled energy” necessary 
for the revolutionary individual creative artist, shaman, 
and mystic, but within which the schizophrenic 
patient becomes defensively frozen. Invoking Wilhem 
Reich’s (1961) concept of an orgone energy whose 
full release becomes a “cosmic consciousness,” and 
which is approached but finally blocked in psychosis, 
Deleuze and Guattari describe the aim of their new 
“schizoanalysis” to “take apart egos ... and liberate 
the pre-personal singularities they enclose ... as freed 
energies” (1972/2009, p. 362). In schizophrenia the 
patient’s experience is “pulled down into the depths of 
the body by [oral] sexualization” (Deleuze, 1969/1990, p. 
218). Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2009) understand the 
resulting body hallucinations in terms of Artaud’s “body 
without organs” (BwO) as his “pure intensities” of inner 
energy flow that obliterate the ordinary sense of body 
image based self-identity. Patients do indeed describe the 
experience of a hollowed body full of bizarrely disruptive 
expressive energies (Angyal, 1936). Deleuze and Guattari 
understand these “intensities” with Jung, rather than 
Freud, as a generalized libido whose narrowed pole is 
“sexual,” but most full expression is “numinous.” “The 
body-without-organs is not God. ... But the energy that 
sweeps through it is divine” (1972/2009, p. 13). Citing 
Laing, they regard madness as more “breakthrough” 
than “breakdown.”
 By the time of their next book A Thousand Plateaus 
(1980/1987), however, their earlier “revolutionary” 
stance of a single monolithic “schizophrenic process” 
had softened. The experience of body-without-organs is 
now explicitly stated as not regressive and as coming in 
multiple forms that can undergo their own development. 
In particular, acknowledging Artaud’s own despair and 
sense of meaninglessness even in his own forays into 
Native American shamanism, they distinguish between 
the “empty” BwO of schizophrenia and its “full” form 
in realized shamanic-mystical states, briefly citing 
Castaneda and the evocative accounts of mescaline 
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imagery in the writings of Henri Michaux (1956/1972). 
In their final major collaboration, What is Philosophy? 
(1991/1994), numinous experience is understood as the 
full development of the “figural” aspect of sense, now 
more clearly separated from the conceptual thought 
of philosophy, and most clearly expressed in Chinese 
hexagrams, Hindu mandalas, and Sufi imaginal realms, 
as well as in the inner “energies,” “vibrations,” and 
“speech” of psychedelic drug experience.  
 It is important to emphasize that these references 
to mystical states remain largely as allusions, and are 
never developed more explicitly in the directions then 
well underway in transpersonal psychology. Deleuze and 
Guattari understand the release of these inner energies 
in Artaud and Michaux as “corporeal,” and taking them 
literally and physically, reject only suggestions that they 
be interpreted as transformations of “body-image” that 
would exteriorize metaphor. More recent accounts of 
bodily hallucinations in schizophrenia (Sass, 1992) and the 
more expansive chakra activations and flow experiences in 
meditation (Hunt, 1995) would regard these experiences 
as intensified gestural/metaphoric expressions—bringing 
them more in line with Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and 
Werner and Kaplan (1963) on the spatial-metaphoric 
foundations of felt meaning. This Deleuze (1969/1990) 
certainly anticipated but did not further develop.
 Before proceeding to Bion’s more explicit 
anticipation of a cognitive psychology of mysticism, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1972/1990) also developed 
their own speculative sociology of the relation between 
the evolution of society and a perhaps too broadly 
defined “schizophrenic process” for the genesis of 
individual creativity and its revolutionary potential. 
They distinguished a progression of societal complexity, 
from tribal, to agricultural, primitive kingship, feudal, 
mercantile, and global capitalism, characterized by what 
they call an increasing “de-territorialization” and an 
increasingly abstract and monetary flow of quantifiable 
power. At each of these stages there is the ever present 
possibility of a more regressive “despotic structure” 
being imposed as the narrower channeling of energy of a 
repressive power—a continuous potential for an incipient 
“fascism” that can ever assert itself anew.3 In their view 
the nuclear family of modern capitalism, with its oedipal 
or primal horde, “despotic structure,” channels but also 
holds in check the potential creativity of the increased 
individuality needed for modern capitalist economies to 
function.
 Classical psychoanalysis and most contemporary 
forms of psychotherapy are seen as actually maintaining 
this “repressive” structure, while their own more 
radical “schizoanalysis,” based on pre-egoic Kleinian 
fragmentation, would support the hyper-differentiation 
needed for the more complete release of the revolutionary 
creative potential of a fully emancipated individual. 
Beneath the repressive oedipal pattern, the free flow of 
energy in capitalism is seen as implicitly encouraging a 
similar un-coding flow within the individual. This also 
means that modern capitalism unwittingly encourages 
schizophrenia as the maximum freeing of channelized 
energy within the individual.4 The need for social 
adaptation will tend to hold that final fragmentation in 
check, rejecting it as “pathological,” while artists, mystics, 
and creative rebels will push through some such inner 
crisis to a more complete independence of the individual 
than was possible in any prior social order. For Deleuze 
and Guattari this offers the only potential for a deeply 
needed valuative revolution within contemporary global 
capitalism.5
 A less radical implication not addressed by 
Deleuze and Guattari, but consistent with the broader 
sociology of religions developed by Max Weber 
(1922/1963) and Ernst Troeltsch (1931/1992), and the 
closely related post-Nietzschean naturlaistic spirituality 
of Bataille (1954/1988; Hunt, 2013), is that modern 
capitalism, with its materialism and prioritizing of 
the individual, will favor, and especially so for the 
educated classes, “this-worldly” or “new age” forms 
of individualizing mystical renewal over the more 
communal prophetic religions. In this regard, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s own formulations of “schizoanalysis,” and 
implied advocacy of shamanism, Sufism, and Taoism 
would be part of that broader tendency. Bion (1971) 
too saw a reciprocal relation, sometimes commensurate, 
sometimes destructive, between “mystic,” as creative 
individual, and “group” as characteristic of modernity.
 It will fit well with Deleuze and Bion that recent 
quantitative research in creativity, shows that while 
those engaged in individual creative endeavors do show 
evidence of considerable inner conflict (above) they also 
report unusually high levels of spontaneous mystical 
states (Michalica & Hunt, 2013).
Bion as “Psychoanalytic Mystic”
 Bion’s (1962) use of Klein’s model of a paranoid-
schizoid pattern of infancy, as the outer manifestation 
of what is later to be internalized as the inner structure 
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of thought, is more consistent with developments in 
subsequent infant research than the more cursory 
treatment of Deleuze and Guattari. For Bion, and his 
fellow psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott (1971), Klein’s 
pattern is based on what would later be termed the 
early reciprocal “mirroring” relation between infant and 
mothering one (Meltzoff, 2002). This is the cross modal 
integration between the infant’s inchoate kinesthetic sense 
of itself and the visual facial and vocal expressions of the 
primal parents, as manifested in early reciprocal smiling 
and later shared expressive vocalization. Internalized 
in subsequent development, these mirrorings become 
the inner structure of the dialogic matrix of thought 
(Meltzoff, 2002).  A later form of this same process of 
developmental internalization of outer behavior into 
inner form will be the shift from childhood “egocentric 
speech” of thoughts-out-loud to the later silent “inner 
speech” of “verbal thought” (Vygotsky, 1965).
 Winnicott (1971) had described the way in 
which the infant discovers the reflection back of its own 
emotional and kinesthetic expressions in the nurturant 
face of the mothering one, allowing its gradual 
internalization as the human form of self-awareness and 
first sense of identity.  For Winnicott that internalization 
will leave open how much of the infant’s kinesthetic 
emotive experience can be “held” and “contained” by 
the primal parents for subsequent reflection and self-
recognition, and this will also vary in terms of infant 
temperament and child rearing practices.6  Bion’s (1962) 
version of this mirroring process further develops its 
intrinsic conflictual aspects. In his more dynamic 
account the relative instabilities of early infant emotion 
mean that its panics and frustrated rages are felt as 
“projectively identified” into the mirroring parent, whose 
directly responsive calm, to the extent it can be present 
in response to an upset infant, allows a “detoxification” 
of those intolerable and ejected experience fragments 
(beta elements). It is only then that the infant can come 
to tolerate their modified reflection back as part of its 
own growing capacity for awareness of self.
 For Bion (1962, 1965, 1971) this intrinsic 
turbulence of early mirroring becomes part of the inner 
dialogic structure and “burden” of an internalized 
symbolic capacity or “alpha function,” with its constant 
dialectic between felt coherence and an always incipient 
incoherence.  Within ongoing thought the inner form 
of this mirroring relation is reflected in a continuous 
tension between “pre-conception” and “selected 
fact,” which, to use the terminology of Piaget (1968), 
will undergo their own reciprocal assimilation and 
accommodation to arrive at whatever “saturation” and 
felt reality is possible in that situation. Bion sees this 
process in terms of an inner “turbulence” between 
the “no-thing” of an incipient but not yet “holding” 
thought, whose originary template is an initially non 
responding or absent mothering one, and the “fact” to 
be understood—which may or may not be “contained” 
and “reflected back,” and whose template in turn will be 
the infant’s emotive state. His often dense language for 
the inner dynamics of the internalized “alpha function” 
of thought echoes Gendlin’s (1962) somewhat more 
accessible phenomenology of a constant inner challenge 
in coordinating our inchoate “felt meanings,” whether 
of interpersonal situation or abstract concept, with our 
successive attempts at their specific articulations—often 
acutely feeling the inadequacy and incoherence of what 
we actually say compared to what we feel and mean.
 It would presumably reflect this internalized 
reciprocity within all thought that, in Bionian terms, 
either felt meaning or its attempted articulation can 
alternatively be identified with either the “containing” 
mothering one or expressive infant, since at any point 
in the unfoldment of understanding either phase can 
be felt as “container” or “contained.” Each phase will 
seek its subsequent “holding” and “reflection” from 
the receiving “other,” while also constituting its own 
“containment” of a preceding expressive phase. Both 
felt meaning and its propositional specification seek to 
“mirror” each other—always approaching or avoiding a 
continuously shifting reciprocity.
 Bion is focused on the reflections of this 
reciprocal process in the more developmentally complex 
levels of abstract self awareness involved in creativity, 
psychosis, and mysticism, where intensifications of 
experience will most directly exteriorize the inner form 
of thought itself.  This will entail the sensitivity to the 
openness of time ahead as such, which then must await, 
or tolerate the waiting for, a corresponding “answer” or 
“containment”—to the extent that might be possible (or 
not) for a given person, cultural era, or a given level of 
more specific creative endeavor. It is these “form near” 
levels of thought that most directly reveal the turbulence 
intrinsic to its inner structure.
 For Bion this capacity to directly sense the 
openness of time ahead, as part of the inner form of 
meaning, gives rise to an intrinsic or existential anxiety 
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that may or may not be “contained” in any completed 
realization. Intolerance of this intrinsic ambiguity gives 
rise to the various “pathologies” of thinking in which 
we may close off all deeper inquiry, suffer its confusion, 
or falsely finish it with precocious and premature 
“answers”—which are what Bion terms the “disease 
of the question.” Creativity for Bion will require what 
Keats referred to as “negative capability”—the capacity 
to remain within the open uncertainty of time ahead, “of 
being in uncertainties, doubts, mysteries, without any 
irritable reaching after fact and reason” (Bion, 1971, p. 
125). This for Bion requires a capacity for “patience” and 
“faith” which is what in the extreme the psychotic patient 
must avoid at all costs—since time ahead inspires there 
what Bion, quoting Pascal, calls the “terrifying silence 
of infinite spaces” (Bion, 1965, p. 171). In psychosis the 
experience of a potential openness of Being is felt as a 
“persecutory” and intolerable domain of “nonexistence,” 
“emptiness,” and “death” (p. 120).  The average person, 
less sensitive to this immediacy of consciousness, will be 
able to deflect such anxieties by everyday over-certainties 
and confusions well short of clinical thought disorder.
 The mystic remains fully open to this inner form 
of time ahead with the resulting potential to experience 
its spontaneous completion as a “formless infinite” 
or “Being,” rather reminiscent of the later Heidegger 
(1972), as its mirroring “answer” and “holding.” Bion 
takes “formless infinite” from Milton, while also using 
Meister Eckhart’s (14th century/1941) concept of an all 
originating emptiness of Godhead as a model of thought 
in which a tacit “felt source of undeveloped distinctions” 
(Bion, 1965, p. 162) “incarnates” within time ahead as the 
more specific forms of meaning. Where this “unrealized” 
source is fully experienced as such it will be felt as a state 
of “ultimate reality”—and sensed as sacred. To the extent 
that the inner turbulence intrinsic to this deep level of 
symbolization can be accepted, then experience can open 
into this sense of an inner redemption.  Such experience 
presupposes a capacity for an abstract form of self 
awareness that is the opposite of anything “regressive.” 
Thus Bion, “the psychoanalytic mystic” (Eigen, 1998), 
sees spirituality, with Maslow (1962), as a needed adult 
development that cannot be assimilated to Freud’s (1930) 
account of an “oceanic experience” of infancy:
The patient’s relationship with God was disturbed 
by [fixated memories of the primal parents] 
which prevented an ineffable experience by their 
concreteness and therefore unsuitability to represent 
the realization. ... [This] would extend psycho-
analytic theory to cover the views of mystics. ... 
The psycho-analyst [then] accepts the reality of 
reverence and awe, the possibility of a disturbance 
in the individual which makes atonement and ... 
an expression of reverence and awe impossible. The 
central postulate is that atonement with ultimate 
reality ... is essential to harmonious mental growth. 
(Bion, 1967, p. 145).
Here Bion offers his own version of an immanent or 
naturalistic mysticism earlier developed by Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, Bataille, and Jung (see Hunt, 2013), one also 
foreshadowed by Deleuze, but whose references to a this-
worldly mysticism remain more allusive.  
A Supporting Cognitive Psychology 
of Mystical States
 Further support for Bion’s approach can be 
found in the author’s own development of a holistic 
cognitive psychology of mystical states that would see 
them as abstract synesthesias of a maximally unitive felt 
meaning, in which the sequential openness of time is 
cross modally translated into the only figural pattern 
that is equally open and pervasive, namely the visual 
form of luminous spaciousness (Hunt, 1989, 1995, 
2006). Such abstract cross modally based felt meanings 
would not be available to the infant of Klein or anyone 
else, where the beginnings of cross modal experience are 
limited to the more concrete translations of facial and 
gestural expression. The later semantic color synesthesias 
for letters, numbers, and categories of time common in 
mid childhood also remain on a more concrete cognitive 
level (Hunt, 2011; Novoa & Hunt, 2009).  It is only the 
mystical states of adolescence and adulthood, and their 
occasional precocious precursors in some children, that 
will require the more abstract synesthesias of light to 
express and become the felt meaning of an all-embracing 
“ultimate reality.”
 However, if felt meaning always rests on cross 
modal translation, then any translation of the relatively 
more specified kinesthetic body image into the 
luminosity of open spaciousness will also be experienced 
as its actual or incipient dissolution into that light—if 
it is to match the openness of light as felt metaphor. 
There would follow the sense described in so much 
ecstatic experience of a felt “annihilation” or “death” 
of a self-identity that is ultimately grounded in a sense 
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of bodily presence (Hunt, 2007).  This sense of bodily 
dissolution makes more understandable the blockage 
and terror described by some psychotic patients 
over just such an imminent annihilation (Schreber, 
1903/1955; Chapman, 1967), and their occasional 
accounts of spontaneous remissions following the more 
complete surrender that can result in classical mystical 
states (Boisen, 1936/1952; Van Dusen, 1972). At the 
same time it would also follow for many persons that 
spontaneous ecstatic states, whatever their temporary 
bliss and unitive sense of redemption, can have later 
more destabilizing effects on a still needed sense of 
personal identity (Almaas, 1986; Eigen, 2001).  
 Following also Lakoff and Johnson (1999) on 
the perceptual roots of metaphor underlying all forms 
of thought, it makes sense that individual performance 
on tasks of spatial orientation and physical balance, 
which have a central body-image component, tends 
to be statistically superior in those who frequently 
report spontaneous mystical states and more integrative 
altered states such as lucid dreaming, while psychotic 
patients, and those describing more dissociative 
states and nightmares, tend to show especially low 
spatial task performance (Hunt, 2007; Gackenbach 
& Bosveld, 1989).  To the extent that sense of self-
identity rests, ultimately on spatial body-image, the 
moment by moment cross modal disassembling of 
perceptual patterns in search of expressive metaphors 
for unfolding felt meanings would become part of 
the incipient turbulence and challenge to coherence 
described by Deleuze, Bion, and Gendlin. The extent 
of such turbulence, and the capacity to allow its fuller 
felt completions in mystical states, would thus vary in 
terms of the relative cohesiveness in the very sense of self 
that has to be surrendered. Accordingly the beginnings 
of such openness will be sensed predominantly as 
incipient freedom and release for some, or “nameless 
dread” for others, while for most it can initiate the more 
ambivalent descriptions of death-rebirth crisis in classical 
shamanism, spontaneous ecstasy, and psychedelic drug 
experience (Eliade, 1964; Laski, 1961; Grof, 1980).  
Some Implications 
for Transpersonal Studies
While one could wonder why Deleuze, in contrast to Bion, did not further pursue the transpersonal 
implications of his phenomenology of “sense,” it will be 
the Indian teacher Krishnamurti who completes this 
linkage from the side of spiritual realization.
Mystical States as Manifestations 
of the Inner Form of Thought
 Although Deleuze and Guattari do not develop 
their more indirect discussions of mystical experience 
to the extent of the later writings of Bion (1965, 1967, 
1971), their shared view of its enhancement of a figural 
dimension within all felt meaning, and their implied 
overlap with Gendlin’s more circumscribed account, 
supports the view of mystical and psychotic states as 
intensifications of the intrinsic tension between coherence 
and incoherence all thought.  Both Deleuze and Bion start 
with the incoherence side of psychotic thought disorder, 
and later shift to the enhanced coherence of mystical 
states—Deleuze and Guattari in their discussion of the 
“full” body-without-organs and Bion on the timeless 
experience of Being as the “holding” and fulfillment of 
the unknown of time ahead.
 Both Deleuze and Bion make use of Klein’s 
concept of a paranoid-schizoid position of early infancy, 
which might seem to necessitate a reductionist or 
regressive understanding of psychotic and mystical states 
that both, however, explicitly reject.  Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980/1987) do not elaborate on their later conclusion 
that the body-without-organs of inner energetic 
transformation comes in many forms and undergoes its 
own development. By contrast Bion explicitly separates 
adult spiritual realization, as a maturation of emotional 
intelligence, from all more concrete fixations of “memory 
and desire” that can block and distort it. The potential 
for mystical experience, and its failure to develop in 
psychosis, show in exaggeration the inner structure of all 
thought.
 That structure is most clearly visible in these 
states and in its first outward manifestations in the 
“mirroring” relations of infancy. These first expressions 
of a cross modal capacity for a dialogically patterned felt 
meaning are what become internalized in subsequent 
development as “thought.”  The formal similarities of Bion 
and Winnicott’s version of “mirroring” to transpersonal 
states thus do not support the regression model put 
forward by a more traditional psychoanalysis, but show 
entirely different developmental levels of externalization 
of the form of thought itself—concrete and behavioral 
in infancy vs. abstractly symbolic in mystical states. 
To add to Bion, the internalization of infant mirroring 
would establish that form as the common matrix for all 
“frames” of human intelligence, while the development of 
an abstract capacity for self awareness as part of Piagetian 
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formal operations, where fully realized within a primarily 
experiential “emotional intelligence,” will instantiate the 
form-near level of experience which will make mystical 
states possible (see Hunt, 1995, 2001; Dale, 2014).
 A question remains as to why the repeated 
allusions of Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2009, 1980/1987, 
1991/1994) to mystical experience, shamanism, the later 
Reich, and Michaux on psychedelic drug states are left 
largely undeveloped. If anything they tend in their later 
discussions to emphasize more a separation between 
the figural/metaphoric enhancements of mystical states 
and conceptual thought, on the one hand, and the 
disintegrative “energies” of psychosis from their earlier 
linkage to the “incorporeals” of sense, on the other. 
While a standard criticism of Deleuze and Guattari 
from a predominantly secular mainstream philosophy, 
suspicious of all that is “non rational,” has been their 
interest in “mysticism” (Smith & Somers-Hall, 2012), one 
could as easily argue, with Ramey (2012), that they did 
not go far enough.8
 Certainly this failure to further develop their 
repeated allusions to these same immanent mysticisms, 
also coincides with Deleuze and Guattari’s increasing 
preoccupation with a more unitive speculative metaphysics 
of “assemblage” or “machines of desire” as self-organizing 
systems common to both human and physical science 
(1980/1987, 1991/1994). These “assemblages” are 
reminiscent, as Deleuze (1988/1993) brings out, of 
the monads of Leibniz, as dynamic gestalts of varying 
complexity and self awareness that equally organize 
inanimate, animate, and human reality. Deleuze and 
Guattari are here anticipating current sciences of chaos 
mathematics and self organizing systems of emergence 
and downward control.9 From the present perspective, 
however, that may have come at the cost of any further 
development of a highly original phenomenology of 
thought—distinct from the physical in its incorporality, 
singularity of meaning, mode of temporal unfoldment, and 
exteriorization in the enhanced coherence/incoherence of 
mystical and psychotic states. What had been Deleuze’s 
earlier hermeneutic distinction between causation and 
forms of meaning may have become less important from 
his final metaphysically unitive conceptual perspective.
Krishnamurti on Self-Realization 
and Felt Meaning
 Perhaps it should not be as surprising as it 
was initially to this author that Deleuze, Bion, and 
by further implication Gendlin, overlap so strikingly 
with the Indian spiritual teacher Krishnamurti on the 
latency of a mystical self-realization within ordinary 
felt meaning. While Deleuze and Bion approach 
transpersonal experience from outside any traditional 
spiritual system or special language, Krishnamurti, after 
his own spontaneous enlightenment and emancipation 
from his earlier training within Besant and Leadbeater’s 
Theosophical Society (Landau, 1964), also became 
widely recognized for his extreme simplicity of 
ordinary usage to convey an enlightenment always 
implicit within semantic experience (Mehta, 1973).10 
For Krishnamurti there is an “immediate perception,” 
the seeming equivalent of Deleuze’s figural dimension, 
within the felt understanding of any situation, which 
if it is not more typically deflected into “verbalization,” 
will spontaneously “complete” itself as an experience of 
“pure energy” and “newness.” This is a felt “communion” 
with the Beingness of that situation (Mehta, 1973)—
essentially the sense of the numinous as understood by 
Deleuze and Bion.
 For Krishnamurti these are the rare moments 
of “pure intelligence” or “mind of innocence,” which 
can be most prominent in nature, and convey a felt 
“eternity” outside the ordinary “continuity of time—
which is based instead on our more usual elaborations of 
a socially conditioned memory, desire, and self-identity. 
It is intriguing in this regard that for both Deleuze 
and Bion, with Krishnamurti, the sense of oneself as 
“thinker” is actually secondary to “thoughts,” only 
emerging after their more primary and spontaneous 
unfoldment—again, the “it thinks” of James and 
Nietzsche. For Krishnamurti, as for Bion (1971), this 
spontaneous “newness” of “total attention” is not possible 
as long as there is any felt division between “what is” 
and “what should be.” Thus he rules out any systematic 
meditative practice, since this presupposes an alienating 
dissatisfaction with one’s here and now experience.
 Where Deleuze, Bion, and Gendlin all 
distinguish a knowing through propositions from a 
primary beingness of felt meaning, Krishnamurti also 
separates our verbal “knowing by ideation” from the 
“knowing by Being” in moments of “total attention.” 
Very much like Bion on the openness of time ahead 
“incarnating” itself as a “formless infinite” expressing 
itself as the singularity of each situation, Krishnamurti 
describes the potential for a fully allowed “immediate 
perception” to reveal an “inner immensity” of space 
whose “negativity” of pure openness—as an emptiness 
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and inner stillness—can receive the totality of any 
situation.  “Since the negative contains nothing, it alone 
can receive the whole” (Mehta, 1973, p. 275).11
 Just as for Bion this spaciousness is “denuded” 
of its incipient beingness in psychosis, Krishnamurti also 
discusses a more destructive “inversion” of immediate 
perception, where the “passive” cessation of verbal 
mind, without that openness and immediate acceptance 
of “what is,” produces a frightening blankness and 
loneliness. It would be only the non resistant acceptance 
of the felt qualities of that loneliness that can transform 
it into a more open “aloneness,” out of which comes a 
“silence” that is
without cause, and therefore has no beginning or 
end...and to such a mind...comes a marvelous silence 
[which] there are no words to describe ... and if you 
have gone that far, then you are enlightened, you do 
not seek anything. (Krishnamurti, 1971, p. 93)
 Where Bion and Winnicott stress the sense 
of a nurturant “holding” within the inner form of felt 
meaning, Krishnamurti similarly compares the “mind 
of innocence” and “communion” to the “nurturant” 
warmth and moisture of soil that receives and fosters 
the planted seed.  In other words Krishnamurti’s “mind 
of innocence” is also structured maternally, and so 
dialogically. Just as Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2009) 
see the creatively released individual as the only avenue 
for genuine social change, Krishnamurti sees the only 
potential for profound social impact in the individual 
“mind of innocence.”  Society for all three approaches is 
necessarily static, and rooted in what Krishnamurti terms 
a secondary, culturally imposed, “associative learning.” 
For Krishnamurti, a badly needed revolutionary social 
change can only come from the impact of the individual 
“mind of innocence” that received back by others 
“completes itself” in them. Bion describes a similar 
opening in the client from the therapist’s own elimination 
of “memory and desire.” In Krishnamurti’s terms, “the 
unexplained innocent behavior of the one initiates in 
the other a movement for fundamental transformation” 
(Mehta, 1973, p. 447). The spontaneous completion of 
the figural or felt foundations of “immediate perception” 
in the one inspires its mirroring in others, and that alone 
for Krishnamurti can fulfill and justify civilization. 
This would describe the charismatic impact of the major 
spiritual teachers of history. Otherwise, Krishnamurti is 
every bit as devastating in his social critique as Deleuze 
and Guattari on “schizoanalysis” as the only authentic 
response to modern culture.
Conclusions
Figures as diverse as Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Wittgenstein (1980), and Ricoeur (1977) have 
understood the human symbolic capacity as resting on 
a metaphoric “seeing as” in which one thing—whether 
as object or vocal sound—becomes the vehicle or “lens 
seen through” by which another is taken as referent. 
For Bion the deep structure of this “seeing as” is that 
of internalized interpersonal relationship. He is also 
saying that this “link” of metaphor and referent bridges 
what he would later (1977) term an intrinsic “caesura,” 
gap, or delay within the very structure of relating. This 
masks an inner nothingness or primal sense of absence 
of “other”—always latent within symbolic experience 
—which the psychotic comes to directly experience as 
incipient annihilation and the mystic comes to accept 
as openness to an answering reflection back of Being. 
Ordinary knowing and feeling buffers and shields 
us from both these closely conjoined possibilities that 
Deleuze also saw as always implied at some level within 
all symbolic expression.
 Deleuze, Bion, to a considerable degree Gendlin, 
and Krishnamurti together understand a “felt meaning” 
or “immediate perception” as the basis for all thought, 
along with its latent potential for expansion as spiritual 
realization. This intriguing convergence of views is the 
closest contemporary version this author has encountered 
to the Buddhist “mind-as-such” of enlightenment and 
“mind applied” of everyday life as reciprocal expressions 
of an ever present “ordinary mind of nowness” 
(Wang-Ch’ug Dor-je, 16th Century/1978; Guenther, 
1989). Here philosopher, mystic, psychoanalyst, and 
phenomenological psychologist all “see the same.”
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Notes
1. Given that Deleuze, Gendlin, and Bion are all 
centered on the more immediately intuitive and 
metaphor based aspects of thought, it is of interest 
that Kounios et al (2008) found that subjects who 
solved problems more intuitively than logically 
showed resting EEG records with higher right 
hemisphere activation in the frontal-temporal areas 
sometimes linked to felt meaning and parietal areas 
linked to metaphor. While Wittgenstein (1980) 
famously rejected the notion that any inner sense of 
meaning can be used to define the primary social 
pragmatics of language, at the same time he also 
called the experience of meaning a “physiognomy” 
and suggested that where it is lacking, one is 
“meaning blind.”
2. Bion, who has been termed “the psychoanalytic 
mystic” (Eigen, 1998), has had an almost revo-
lutionary impact on contemporary psychoanalytic 
theory, insisting that theoretical and clinical 
psychoanalysis can be entirely consistent, as 
Jung had originally maintained, with an intrinsic 
spiritual dimension of mind. In this regard Bion’s 
work builds a bridge into transpersonal psychology, 
also developed by Almaas (1986) and Wilber (1984), 
such that transpersonal states intrinsically interact 
with psychodynamic issues without being reducible 
to them.  Excellent summaries of Bion’s overall work 
can be found in Symington and Symington (1996) 
and Eigen (1998), while there is also a more “post-
modern” tendency to romanticize and imaginatively 
elaborate his writings (Grotstein, 2007) in a way 
that while stimulated by his later more informal 
clinical books (1974, 1975, 2005), nonetheless loses 
much of his highly original, if often cryptic, dignity 
and deeply moving sobriety.
3. Trigger (2003) located an early form of such a 
recessive “despotic structure” in his observations on 
the grave relics in early primitive kingships—in both 
old and new worlds. He was struck by the extreme 
and archeologically sudden difference between the 
opulence of artifacts in the graves of the elite and the 
comparative coarseness of these same objects in the 
graves of the newly emerging mass of commoners—
many of whom, as artisans, would presumably have 
made the objects of such beauty and refinement 
found in the graves of the elite. The widespread 
appearance of human sacrifice in such societies 
would be part of the enforcement of these newly 
extreme disparities.
4. Although it may seem extreme to trace any direct 
causation between capitalism and schizophrenia, 
Sass (1992) has suggested that the high demands 
for personal autonomy and competitive functioning 
in modern economies may accentuate the isolation 
and potential breakdown of patients who might 
have adapted better to the slower pace of more 
traditional agrarian societies. He also shows that 
the extreme valuation of separate individuality in 
capitalist societies is associated with modern art 
forms that emphasize a “hyper-reflexivity” of inner 
self consciousness that seems further exaggerated 
in the “prodromal” and “first rank” symptoms of 
schizophrenia. If one adds in the seemingly endemic 
diagnoses of clinical depression and the extent of its 
medications, it may be that capitalism is the form 
of social organization that least protects the modern 
individual from pushing creative sensitivities into 
overt psychosis.
 5. If Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2009) are correct 
on radical individualization (their “schizophrenic 
process”) as the only avenue for revolutionary social 
change, and one sees the increasing economic 
inequities and automation of many working roles as 
examples of a newly emerging “despotic structure” 
within global capitalism, then the mass creation of 
large numbers of disenfranchised, unemployable 
youth, along with the spreading despair and 
alienation of their widespread drug use (for which 
one can hardly blame them), seems a very high 
price to pay for the small increase in the number of 
revolutionarily creative individuals that might also 
result on this model.
6. The French psychoanalyst Lacan (1973/1981) 
suggested a further fundamental disparity or split 
between the intrinsically undefined and “shapeless” 
qualities of kinesthesis and the more “complete” 
gestalts of the visually seen other, conferring some 
degree of intrinsic predominance, convincingness, 
and felt “reality” of the “other” over the more 
phenomenologically open, kinesthetic sense of self. 
Internalized as the structure of thought on the 
model of Bion (1962) and Meltzoff (2002) this will 
add an additional inner turbulence to that dialogic 
matrix.
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7. The author (Hunt, 1995, 2000, 2011; and see also 
Dale, 2014) has suggested that mystical states and 
peak experiences, with their equilibrating oneness of 
self and others, would represent, in Piagetian terms, 
the initial appearance of a not commonly realized 
“formal operations” in the “affective schemata” of a 
separate developmental line of emotional intelligence. 
This might be a more parsimonious account than 
previous suggestions (Wilber, 1984) of spirituality as 
the “post formal” stages of a single ladder model for 
all intelligence.
8. Part of this reluctance on the part of Deleuze might 
also have stemmed from his apparently intense 
pre-academic immersion in more controversial 
Hermetic and esoteric spiritual traditions (Ramey, 
2012).  This may have cast a more negative shadow 
over the general area of such inquiry for the older 
philosophical Deleuze, who seems to have preferred 
an overview of spirituality based on the more 
abstract immanence of Spinoza (Deleuze, 2001) to 
any more detailed and explicit discussion of major 
mystical traditions.
 9. The later Deleuze (1991/1994, 1988/1993; Smith 
& Somers-Hall, 2012) speculated about a potential 
mathematics of the planes and shapes of analytic 
geometry as underlying all such “machines” or self 
organizing systems within mind and matter, thereby 
perhaps also undercutting his earlier anticipation of 
Lakoff and Johnson’s figural or metaphoric image 
schemas for all thought.  It may be a reflection of 
the sheer difficulty of separating metaphor from 
its literalizations that Bion (1965) too suggested, 
but did not develop, a mathematical geometry as 
the inner source of abstract thought. By contrast, 
in the alternative primacy of figural metaphor as 
understood by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and 
Hunt (1995, 2006, 2011), a shared matrix of spatial/
dynamic synesthetic patterns would be unfolded, at 
its more abstract levels, within the representational 
symbolisms as mathematics (Lakoff and Nunez, 
2000) and in the presentational-aesthetic symbolisms 
as the mandala/chakra forms of psychedelic and 
mystical states. Rather than reducing any one 
symbolic form to any other, it would seem more 
plausible to show how each emerges from a shared 
cross modal capacity, abstracted out of the separate 
perceptual modalities and so available for all frames 
of intelligence.
10. Almaas (1984) comments that the sheer simplicity 
of Krishnamurti’s use of a nonspecialized ordinary 
language to express his own realization makes it all 
too easy for many readers to miss the depth and 
profundity of what is described.
11. The striking overlap in concept and some phraseology 
between Bion and Krishnamurti makes one 
wonder if Bion, either in the 1930s when a younger 
Krishnamurti was in England, or after 1968 when 
Bion had re-settled in California and had begun to 
read in the Bhagavad-Gita, might have attended 
any of Krishnamurti’s public lectures. There is no 
mention of any such contact in Bleandonu’s (1994) 
biography of Bion, and the deceptive simplicity of 
Krishnamurti’s language could certainly have either 
remained as implicit background for Bion or been 
independently developed as his own spontaneous 
realization.
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